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STATE of Utah, Petitioner, 
• • . . : , v . , >•. 
P 
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ft - • 
- h Anne M. STIRBA, Judge, Third Judicial 
J"" District Court, Salt Lake County, 
P 
O 
o 
0 
Utah, Respondent; 
Laura M. Morrison, Irttervehor. 
No. 981383-CA 
Court of Appeals of Utah.af,; 
, Dec. 24, 1998. 
State commenced (original proceeding) 
i CO 
3 < 
Q seeking extraordinary writ in nature of man 
— * damus compelling the District Court, Salt 
Lake County, Anne M. Stirba, J., to order 
additional restitution in criminal case in 
which defendant had been convicted of theft 
by receiving stolen property. The Court of 
Appeals, Orme, J., held that: (1) State did not 
have right to ^appeal restitution order; (2) 
State was eligible; for extraordinary writ re-
lief because of lack of alternative remedy; (3) 
judge did not breach her nondiscretionary 
statutory duty to, order appropriate restitu-
tion, and thus mandamus relief was not avail-
able on that basis; and (4) judge's error in 
determining that defendant could not be re-
quired to pay restitution to victim who has 
been reimbursed by insurance did not qualify 
kind of gross and flagrant abuse of discn? 
ion that could support issuance of writ. 
iscreN 
7) 
Extraordinary writ denied. 
Criminal Law <3=>1024(9) 
State may not appeal orders of restitu-
tion. U.C.A.1953, 77-18a-l(2). 
2. Criminal Law e=*1024(l) 
Statute setting forth specific judgments 
and orders from which the State may appeal 
in criminal cases is restrictive rather than 
permissive and, thus, the State has no right 
3. Criminal jLaw <S^JLUUO.I 
State could not use writ of mandamus to 
circumvent restriction against appealing or-
ders of restitution, and thus was not entitled 
to same scope of review available on statuto-
ry appeal. U.C.A.1953, 77-18a-l(2); Rules 
;Civ.Proc.,Rule65B(d)(4). 
4. Mandamus <S=>4(4) •'• St-
State was entitled to seek relief in na-
ture of writ of mandamus from trial judge's 
order limiting restitution in criminal case 
because it lacked authority to take statutory 
appeal from restitution order. U.C.A.1953, 
77-18a-l(2); Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 65B(d)(4). 
5. Criminal Law <3=>1012 
Mandamus <3=>3(7) -
Vidtims' right to pursue civil damages 
against defendant did not provide State with 
plain, speedy and adequate remedy, so ais to 
preclude State from seeking writ of manda-
mus relief from trial court's order in criminal 
case limiting amount of restitution. Rules 
Civ.Proc, Rule 65B(d)(4). ; ; ; 
6. Mandamus <S=*28 
Writ of mandamus relief is available to 
direct exercise of discretionary action, but 
hot to direct the trial court's exercise of 
judgment or discretion in particular way. 
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 65B(d)(2)(B).' " '< 
7. Criminal Law <s>1208.4(2) 
Sentencing judge had nondiscretionary 
duty to order defendant to make appropriate 
restitution. U.C.A.1953, 76-3-201(4)(a)(i). 
8. Criminal Law e=*1208.4(2) 
Mandamus <£=>61 
u Judge did not breach her nondiscretion-
ary statutory duty to order appropriate resti-
tution, and thus did not provide ground for 
State to obtain mandamus relief on basis thkt 
she had failfed to perform legally required 
act, when she refused to include amounts 
previously paid by insurance in directing that 
defendant compensate victims of car theft for 
their losses; "criteria and procedures" that 
trial judge was required to follow in deter-
mining propriety and amount of restitution Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
emphasis added); Indian Village Trading 
lost, Inc. v. Bench, 929 P.2d 367, 370 (Utah 
3t.App.1996) ("Thus, under Rule 65B[], a 
)etitioner may seek to . . . compel correction 
>f a public officer's gross abuse of discretion 
under] Utah R, Civ, P. 65B[ (d)J(2)(A).,,) 
citation omitted; emphasis added). 
[10,11] In this case, Judge Stirba's rui-
ng that "a defendant cannot be required to 
>ay restitution:. .••. to a victim who :has al-
eady been reimbursed by the victim's insur-
.nce carrier" was an incorrect interpretation 
•f the restitution statute then in effect.4 
lowever, a simple mistake of law does not 
[ualify as the kind of j^ros5 and flagrant 
,buse of discretion necessary for a Rule 
SB(d)(2)(A) writ to issue. . . . , 
[12] Moreover, while courts may find an 
buse of discretion and issue a Rule 
>5B(d)(2)(A) writ in the face of,a particularly 
egregious and momentous legal error, see, 
.g., Frederick, 890 R2d at 1019-21, the 
ourts may not routinely use the writ as a 
ubstitute..for, an appeal. . See Merrihew v. 
\alt[. Lake, County Planning and Zoning 
:omm% 659 P.2d 1065, 1067 (Utah 1983). 
'he Legislature has exactingly limited the 
udgments ,apd qrders from which the State 
. Judge Stirba based her ruling on this court's 
holding in State v. Westerman, 945 P.2d 695 
(Utah Ct.App.1997), that "an insurance company 
is not a victim as defined in [the restitution 
statute]" and therefore not entitled to restitution 
payments. Id. at 699. However, the restitution 
statute applicable when Judge Stirba entered her 
ruling provided that "[f]or purposes of restitu-
tion, a victim has the meaning as defined in 
Section 77-38-2," Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
201(4)(a)(i) (Supp.1997), which section defined 
"victim" as 
any natural person against whom the charged 
crime or conduct is alleged to have been 
perpetrated or attempted by the defendant or 
minor personally or as a party to the offense or 
conduct, or, in the discretion of the court, 
against whom a related crime or act is alleged 
to have been perpetrated or attempted. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-38-2(9)(a) (Supp.1997). 
Acknowledging that "the result is troublesome," 
the Westerman court held that an insurance com-
pany does not fair within this definition of "vic-
tim." 945 P.2d at 699. However, the restitution 
order challenged in Westerman was an order 
mandating payment of restitution directly to the 
\>irtim\ insurpr. RpjR id a t 696 . 
I ^ 
may appeal in criminal cases, none of which K ^ 
include restitution orders. See Utah Code ^T ^ 
Ann. § 77-18a-l(2) (Supp.1998). Although ^ ~J 
the State brings its Rule 65B(d)(2)(A) claim ^ P 
as^ji original action^ this proceeding has the x ^ O 
^ame characteristics, and seeks the same re- ** 
view and relief, as would a statutory appeal 
from Judge1' Stirba's restitution order. 
Hence, to avoid transforming this action into 
an impermissible appeal, we must deny the ** 
State's requester a Rule 65B(d)(2)(A) writ 
of mandamus. 
3 
P 
9 
o 
1 
C 0 
o 
3 
CONCLUSION,. 
Based;;on our determination that Judge 
Stirba neither failed to perform a legally-"""0 Q 
required act under Rule 65B,(d)(2)(B),nor Q -t 
^abused her discretion) under Rule 
j35B(d)(2)(A), coupled with our holding that 
the State's action is tantamount to an imper-
missible appeal, the State's Petition for Ex-
traordinary Writ'is hereby denied. 
RUSSELL W. BENCH, Judge, and ; 
JUDITH M. BILLINGS, Judge, concur. 
9 
p B 
victim. As we noted in State v. Haga, 954 P.2d 
1284, 1289 (Utah Ct.App. 1998), Westerman has 
no application absent an order specifically re-
quiring that the defendant pay restitution directly 
to an insurance company. Accordingly, because 
the restitution recipient in this case was to be the 
very persons against whom the charged crime 
was perpetrated, and not an insurer, Judge Stir-
ba misapplied the Westerman holding in inter-
preting the restitution statute. 
We also note that the Legislature has ad-
dressed the substantive issue in this case, i.e., the 
propriety of restitution orders for amounts cov-
ered by a victim's insurance. Following the 
Westerman ruling, the Legislature took the Wes-
terman court up on its suggestion to "enact re-
medial legislation," 945 P.2d at 695 n. 5, dealing 
with any unintended effects of that decision. See 
1998 Utah Laws ch. 149, § 1. Hence, effective 
May 4, 1998, the restitution statute defines "vic-
tim" as "any person whom the court determines 
has suffered, pecuniar}' damages as a result of 
the defendant's criminal activities." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-201 (l)(e)(i) (Supp.1998). See Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(a)(i) (Supp.1998). Be-
cause this definition is far less restrictive than 
the definition considered in Westerman and cer-
tainly broad enough to include insurance comna-
i 
r 
e 
I 
9 
to 
HO 
s 
O 
P 
b 
h 
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5. Criminal Law <S=>260.3 OPINION 
Criminal defendant's right to an "ap-
peal" from a court not of record is satisfied 
by provision for a trial de novo in a court of 
record/ Const. Art. 1, § 12; U.C.A.1953, 78-
5-120; Rules Crim.Proc, Rule 26(12); Judi-
cial Administration Rule 4-608." 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and def-
initions. 
6. Criminal Law <3=>260.13 
On appeal of a conviction from justice 
court, the parties essentially get a fresh start 
in the form of a trial de novo. U.C.A.1953, 
78-5-120; Rules Crim.Proc, Rule 26(12); 
Judicial Administration Rule 4-608. . 
7. Criminal Law ^260.11(1) 
In an appeal from justice court, district 
court is not acting in a typical appellate 
capacity; because the justice court is hot a 
court of record, the "appeal" does not involve 
a review of the justice court proceedings 
which result in a judgment U.C.A.1953, 78-
5-120; Rules Crim.Proc, Rule 26(12); Judi-
cial Administration Rule 4-608. 7 
8. Criminal Law e=>260.12 
District court judge's attempt to remand 
to justice court a case in which defendant 
sought trial de novo was abuse of discretion. 
y.C.A.1953, 78-5-120; Rules Cja&Proc, 
Rule 65B(d)(2)(A); Judicial Administration 
Rule 4-608(2)(E j . . , 
*•' Joan C7 Watt and Matthew G. Nielsen, 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Ass'n, Salt Lake 
City, for Petitioner; f 
x Brent MiJ Johnson, Salt Lake City, for 
Respondent: u^ 
Jan Graham , Atty.. Gen., and Norman E. 
Plate, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for 
Amicus Curiae Utah Attorney General. 
BENCH, Judge: 
111: Pursuant to Rule 65B of the Utah 
Rules: of Civil Procedure and Rule 19 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, petition-
er Richard Dean asks this court for.an ex-
traordinary writ ordering^ respondent, a 
judge of the Third District Court, to rein-
state petitioner's appeal from a conviction in 
Salt Lake County Justice Court. We grant 
the petition. 
BACKGROUND 
112 Following a bench trial in justice 
court, Dean was convicted of shoplifting. 
Dean appealed this conviction to the district 
court, requesting a trial de novo as autho-
rized by statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-
3-4(5) (Supp.1998) ("The district court has 
appellate jurisdiction to adjudicate trials de 
novo of the judgments of the justice court 
. . . ; " ) ; id. § 78-5-120 (Supp.1998) (provid-
ing "[a]ny person not satisfied with a judg-
ment rendered in a justice court . . . is enti-
tled to a trial de novo in the district court"). 
The district court case was assigned to re-
spondent, who scheduled a pretrial confer-
ence/When Dean did not appear, respon-
dent continued the pretrial conference to the 
following month. 
H3 The-next month, Dean again failed to 
appear at the pretrial conference. Respon-
dent properly issued a bench warrant for 
Dean's arrests However, respondent went 
on to dismiss the appeal and remand the case 
to the justice court for further proceedings. 
De^ri then filed a motion to reinstate the 
appeal in the district court, which respondent 
denied. Dean now petitions this court to 
order respondent to. reinstate his appeal and 
to conduct the required trial de novo. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1] 114 This case is an original proceed-
ing in this court challenging a judicial action 
under Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Therefore, our scope of review is 
limited and "shall not extend further than to 
determine whether the respondent has regu-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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13. A c t i o n <S==>63 
If litigants ask for extraordinary writs 
of prohibition and permit other rights to 
expire, they do so at their peril. 
PRATT, J., dissenting. ' ; 
Original proceeding by James Robinson 
against the City Court for the City of 
Ogden, Weber County, State of Utah, and 
J. Quill Nebeker, Judge thereof, to pro-
hibit the judge from enforcing a certain 
judgment holding the petitioner in con-
tempt of court and sentencing him to a 
fine or term in jail. 
Alternative writ made permanent. 
Edward W. Clyde, of Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff.. 
Ira A. Huggins, of Ogden, for defend-
ants. 
LATIMER, Justice. 
Petitioner instituted original proceed-
ings in this court to prohibit' defendant 
Judge of the City Court of Ogden City, 
Utah, from enforcing a certain judgment 
holding petitioner in contempt of court and 
sentencing him to a fine or term in jail. 
The facts out of which this controversy 
arose are these; Petitioner had appeared 
in the City Court of Ogden City to answer 
a criminal charge of disturbing the peace. 
Defendant judge heard the matter, peti-
tioner was found guilty, and ordered to pay 
a fine or in the alternative to serve a jail 
sentence. Petitioner then left the court-, 
house and about one-half hour later re-
turned to the office of the city attorney to 
pay the fine. He was directed to go to the 
office of the desk sergeant, which was lo-
cated on the ground floor of the same 
building. The defendant judge had recess-
ed court and was preparing to leave the-
building. The judge and petitioner arrived 
at the elevator shaft on the fifth floor of 
the building about the same time, both, 
waiting for the elevator and as they 
stepped on, the petitioner made the fol-
lowing statement: "That is the worst ex-
ample of a Kangaroo Court I have ever 
seen." The judge overheard it, took the 
petitioner by the arm, escorted him to the 
the assistant city attorney and the clerk 
of the court to accompany both himself and 
the petitioner to the courtroom. The judge 
then took off his hat and coat, convened 
the court, found the petitioner guilty of 
contempt for having made the remark, and 
imposed sentence. 
[1] A reference to the applicable stat-
utes and cases in respect to contempts and 
procedure for punishing, if committed, will 
suffice to dispose of this proceeding. Sec-
tion 104—45—1, U.C.A., 1943, enumerates 
acts and omissions constituting contempt. 
The substance of the sections applicable 
here are: (1) That disorderly, contemptu-
ous or insolent behavior toward the judge 
while holding the court tending to interrupt 
the due course of trial or other judicial 
proceeding are contempts of the authority 
of the court, and (2) Any other unlawful 
interference with the process or proceed-
ings of the court are likewise contemptu-
ous acts. •;,-•.•...• 
The facts of this proceeding do not bring 
the petitioner under the first quoted sub-
section. Admitting, if necessary, that peti-
tioner's behavior was contemptuous or in-
solent, it was expressed while the judge 
and petitioner were either in the elevator 
or just about to enter it. The judge was 
not holding court, he had already adjourn-
ed the morning session, he was on his way 
out of the building, and no trial or other 
judicial proceedings were then in progress. 
[2] There is grave doubt that petition-
er's conduct was such as to constitute a 
violation of the second provision of the 
statute quoted herein. The rule announc-
ed by the Supreme Court of the United 
States and by this court is that criticism 
after final disposition of an action is the 
exercise of the right of free speech and 
therefore not contemptuous. See Bridges 
v. State of California, 314 U.S. 252, 62 
S.Ct. 190, 86 L.Ed. 192, 159 A.L.R. 1346; 
Kirkham v. Sweetring, 108 Utah 397, 160 
P.2d 435. In view of our decision on the 
other aspect of this case, it is not necessary 
to comment on the contention that the be-
havior of the petitioner. went beyond the 
limits of criticism. 
.Section 104—45—3, U.C.A., 1943, pro-
ofs. \-P o r 
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jlie Use of the Writ of Prohibition in the State 
of Utah as a Means of Intermediary Review. 
Justice James H. Wolfe 
Of The Supreme Court Of The State of Utah 
yhe role of the Writ of Prohibition 
a procedure for intermediary review 
Lad its birth in necessity. Courts long 
v
 iaVe recognized that inferior tribunals, 
while proceeding strictly within proper 
' jurisdictional limits, may nevertheless pro-
:
 ceed so as erroneously to place one qr both 
parties in a position from which they can-
not retrieve themselves. The damage done 
may be irreparable. A pronouncement by 
ihe appellate court, correcting the error 
may not result in undoing the damage. In 
•j896, the year the Constitution of Utah 
• became operative, 1 our Supreme Court 
Held that article 8, sec. 9 of the 
Constitution, which provides that an ap-
peal shall lie ''from all final judgments 
of the district courts," was a limitation on 
the power of the Supreme Court to en-
tertain appeals. 2 Under this holding 
|e court had no power under the Con-
stitution to entertain any appeal other 
than from final judgments. This meant, 
of course, that the prohibition against 
allowing an appeal from other than final 
judgments rested, not on <the immemorial 
custom or policy of the common law 
based on reasons of economy and order-
liness of litigation, but on a constitution-
al inhibition. It meant that the legislature 
could not provide for review in cases 
where such review was not only highly 
desirable from a stand point of economy 
of time, effort and expense*but, as we 
shall later see, in cases where it was 
necessary in order to save a party from 
J the results of an action of the lower court 
| from which he could not be retrieved. 
No matter how palpable the injustice 
done or how clearly erroneous the action 
of the lower court appeared to be, the 
Supreme Court was powerless on appeal 
to grant relief until the procedure had 
terminated in a final judgment. And this 
meant that counsel sometimes had to, 
speculate at their peril upon whether a 
judgment was final or not—not always 
an easy matter as witness the case of At-
torney General v. Pomeroy, 93 Utah 
426, 73 P . (2d) 1277. In the interlude 
between grevious error and final judg-
ment the aggrieved party could suffer in-
jury, and an appeal to correct the holding 
after the injury sought to be prevented 
had already occurred might be a fruitless 
victory. ; 
This holding that the Supreme Court 
had no jurisdiction to entertain appeals 
except from final judgments obtained until 
1937, when it was expressly overruled 
in Attorney General v. Pomeroy, 93 
Utah 426,73 P. (2d) 1277. It"is out 
of this background that the writ o*f pro-
hibition has^ evolved into a limited writ 
of supervisory control and within certain 
limits a remedy for intermediate review. 
At this time it is perhaps well to warn 
the bar that in any case the writ of pro-
hibition cannot be used as a means of ar-
resting merely erroneous action except 
under very limited conditions which we 
shall soon consider. 
The writ of prohibition is a. common 
law writ of ancient origin. "It arose be-
cause a variety of courts came into being 
whose separate spheres of jurisdiction 
(1) Became operative January 4, 1896 by Presi-
dential Proclamation. See Anderson v. Tyree, 12 
TTJ._I_ i o n A 9 T> 9011 
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5 might have been desired. If the writ 
•as not first originated for the purpose 
f restricting the authority of the eccles-
.stical courts, it acquired its largest use 
>r that purpose/' s It is noted in 
ollock and Maitlandl, History of Eng-
sh Law. Vol. I, p. 129, that from the 
ay of Henry I'l onward the royal court 
as always ready to prohibit ecclesiastical 
idges from entertaining certain cases. 
aeon introduces his discussion of Pro-
bition as follows: 
"As all external jurisdiction, whether 
:clesiastical or civil, is derived from the 
own, and the administration of justice 
committed to a great variety of courts, 
:nce it hath been the care of the crown, 
at these courts keep within the limits 
id bounds of their several jurisdictions 
'escribed them by the laws and statutes 
:
 the realm. And for this purpose the 
rit of prohibition was framed; 
hich issues out of the superior courts of 
>mmon law to restrain the inferior courts, 
hether such courts be temporal, eccles-
stical, maritime, military, etc., upon 
suggestion that the cognizance of the 
after belongs not to such courts; and in 
,se they exceed their jurisdiction, the of-
:er who executes the sentence, and in 
me cases the judges that give it, are 
such superior courts punishable, 
metimes at the suit of the king, some-
oes at the suit of the party, sometimes 
the suit of both, according to the na-
t*e of the case. . . . 
"The object of prohibition in general 
the preservation of the right of the 
ig's crown and courts, and the ease 
d quiet of the subjects. For it is the 
sdom and policy of the law, to sup~ 
se both best preserved when every thing 
ns in its right channel, according to the 
tginal jurisdiction of every court; for by 
2 same reason that one court might be 
owed to encroach, another might; which 
uld produce nothing but confusion and 
>order in the administration of justice.*' 4 
S) Ol&on v. Dis t r ic t Cour t , 1<06 U t a h 220, 147 
wiieii on oepxemoer y, 103U, the 
Congress of the United States enacted 
"An act to Establish A Territorial Gov-
ernment for Utah" known as the Organic 
Act, no mention was made of the writ 
of prohibition. That act provided: 
"That the judicial power of said ter-
ritory shall be vested in a Supremp Court, 
District Court, Probate Court and in 
Justices of the Peace. . . The jurisdiction 
of the several courts herein provided for, 
both appellate and original, and that of j 
probate courts and of Justices of the peace 
shall be as limited by law* Provided, ^ 
' that. . . . the said Supreme Court and 
District courts respectively shall possess 
chancery as well - as common law juris-
diction. . . . and each of said District 
Courts shall have and exercise the same 
jurisdiction in all cases arising under the 
Constitution and laws of the United States 
as is vested in the circuit and district courts 
of the United States. . ."5 
The Act also expressly provided for the 
issuance of writs of habeas Corpus but 
the othier extraordinary writs of cer-
tiorari, prohibition, quo warranto and 
mandamus were not mentioned. * I 
Section 4 of the Act vested the legis- I 
lative power of the Territory in the gov; | 
ernor and a legislative assembly, ^ec. 0 1 
provided that the legislative power "SMH j 
extend ta all rightful subjects of legisl*; | 
jtion, consistent with the Constitution oj 
the United States and the provisions J* 
this Act." In Ferris v. Higley, 20 WaB-
375, 11 L. Ed. 383, in discussing n* j 
power of the Legislature given by Sec- J 
of the Act the United States Supra* J 
Court said: j "^ 
"We may, I think, assume, w*j£ 
much hazard, that defining the juriso* ^ 
tion of a probate court, or, indeed o j 
court, may be fairly included ^ ^ f y j j 
general meaning of the phrase ng ,J| 
subject of legislation." - , J 
In 1870 the Legislative ^$f^l 
C ' he fir **^ 'AS 
provided for the issuance or wrns ^ -m 
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\ . * and mandamus. 6 This new 
• rtment was before the court in Shep-
•*£
 v. District Court, 1 Utah 340. The 
hon w a s a n o^S"1^ proceeding for a 
*.'t of mandamus. The Territorial Su-
me Court, after noting that in 1874 
I
 ngress had enacted a statute giving 
it Utah district courts "exclusive" ori-
nal jurisdiction in all suits or proceed-
• o$ in chancery, and all actions at law in 
• Ljch the sum or value of the thing in 
ontroiversy shall be three hundred dollars 
*r upwards, held that it had no original 
iurisdiction to issue mandamus. While 
I the holding was later reversed it was in 
effect a holding that the Legislative As-
<embly. for the territory could not grant 
lo the Supreme Court original jurisdiction 
t0 issue the extraordinary writ of man-
;ramus except in the aid of its appellate 
jurisdiction. The same reasoning would 
apply to writs of prohibition and other 
extraordinary writs. 
This reasoning was in part repudiated 
in Maxwell v. Burton, 2 Utah 595. In 
Young v. Cannon, 2 Utah 560 the terri-
torial Supreme Court held that it had 
original jurisdiction under the territorial 
Statute to issue the writ of certiorari. Both 
of the latter decisions were approved in 
People v. Spiers, 4 Utah 353, wherein 
die court noted: 
I "The conclusion to be drawn from 
ttkse decisions is that whether this court 
pas, under the organic act, and subse-
quent acts of Congress, original jurisdic-
tion or not to issue the writs of this class 
is not material, as the legislature of the 
f territory has authority to give such juris-
diction, and had done so/5 
The fcower of the Legislative Assem-
bly to authorize the issuance of the writ 
of prohibition was thus expressly upheld. 
Tiie power was exercised in 1884. (L. 
1884, Sec. 982 and 983 ) . The statute 
^acted has remained throughout all sub-
sequent compilations and codes, substan-
tially without change. It provided: 
"The writ of prohibition is the counter-
part of the writ of mandate. It arrests the 
proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, 
board or person, whether exercising func-
tions judicial or ministerial when such pro-
ceedings are without or in excess of the 
jurisdiction of such tribunal, corporation, 
board or person. 
"It may be issued by any court except 
probate or justices courts to an inferior 
tribunal or to a corporation board, or per-
son, in all cases when there is not a 
plain speedy, and adequate remedy in 
the ordinary course of law. . ." 7 
This statute was first examined by the 
court in Ducheneau v. House, 4 Utah 
369, 10 P . 838. The case involved an 
attempt by a justice of the peace to pass 
upon questions involving the title to real 
property, a subject matter over which he 
had no jurisdiction. Before the writ is-
sued the justice of the peace had decid-
ed the case. All that remained to be done 
was to issue execution, which admittedly 
was a ministerial act. The contention was 
made that the writ of prohibition would 
not issue to prohibit the doing of minis-
terial acts; that it, like the common law 
writ, was limited to preventing the exer-
cise of judicial function without jurisdic-
tion. The court held to the contrary. It 
said: 
"The district courts have general com-
mon-law and chancery jurisdiction and 
that covers about everything of a civil 
or criminal nature not expressly committed 
to some other, tribunal: Ferris v. Higley, 
20 W a l l 375. W e can readily see that 
this general jurisdiction would embrace 
the common-law writ of prohibition, and 
that the legislature could in no? way de-
prive the district courts** of such jurisdic-
tion. But the legislature, in pursuance of 
its authority given by the organic act to 
legislate upon all 'rightful subjects of 
legislation/ has seen fit, and has the Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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jndoubted right, as occasions arise, to 
:reate new offenses, new subjects for ju-
dicial investigation, and new ways and 
neans to enforce the authority of the 
:ourts and officers,
 x and we can see no 
eason to conclude that the giving of ad~ 
litional power to the writ of prohibition 
vas not a 'rightful subject of legisla-
ton 
The contention that the territorial leg-
dature had no authority to enlarge the 
:ope of the common law writ was thus 
icpressly overruled. 
State ex rel Robinson v. Durand, 36 
Jtah 93 , 104 P . 760, was the first 
iportant case involving the writ of pro-
bition to be decided after the adoption 
:
 the Utah Constitution. Section 4, Ar-
:Ie 8 ojf the Constitution had expressly 
ven the Supreme Court original jurisdic-
>n to issue writs of prohibition together 
ith the other writs of mandamus, cer-
>rari, quo warranto and habeas corpus, 
hereafter the legislature enacted a sta-
te expressly providing for the use of the 
rit c:f prohibition to review the action of 
stice's courts in refusing to dismiss pro-
edings shown by special appearance to 
ve been commenced in the wrong pre-
ict. The said statute obviously permit-
1 the use of the writ purely as a writ of 
rriew. Even though the actions were 
mmenced in the wrong precinct there 
is no lack or excess of jurisdiction. 
->r was the remedy by appeal inade-
ate. The court noted that it was un-
!e to assent to the principle that the 
islature could thus enlarge the scope 
the writ. Some doubt was expressed 
to whether the writ provided for in 
Constitution was the common law 
t as distinguished from the writ as it 
>ted in the territory immediately pre-
ing the adoption of the Constitution, 
wever, the court refused to decide 
question because it held that both the 
itorial writ and the common law writ 
aired that there be a lack oar an ex-
the ordinary course of the law. In hold-
ing the statute unconstitutional, the court 
noted: 
*'Whether the writ, as defined by the 
territorial laws, should be regarded as the 
writ of prohibition known to the com-
mon law, or as an enlargement of that 
writ, need not now be determined. For, 
whichever view, may be taken of the ques-
tion, it is very manifest that the only of-
fice of the writ was to prevent usurption 
of jurisdiction and to restrain acts in ex-
cess of or without jurisdiction, and not to 
review proceedings and to correct error, 
and that such an office was the only func-
tion which the territorial courts had ever 
given it. If therefore it is considered that 
the writ mentioned in the Constitution is 
the writ as it existed under the laws of the 
territory, with functions as declared by 
the territorial courts, and is the writ as 
we knew it, and as it was applied in the 
territory when the Constitution was adopt-
ed, still the office of the writ, as defined; 
by the enactment, is clearly and unques-
tionably repugnant to the meaning of the 
writ. The legislation in question not only 
enlarged the office of the writ, but com-
pletely changed its character and ^ con* 
verted it into a mere writ of review-
The statute was thus held to be uncon-
stitutional and the power of legislature to 
expand the scope of the writ was denied* 
The question as to whether the ^  Consti-
tution refers to the writ as it existed ^ 
the territory at the time the Constitution 
was adopted or to the common law wn-» 
was definitely set at rest in "J^L 
v. Lehi City, 74 Utah 321 , 279 P. 8 ' * 
The case involved an application to* 
writ of prohibition to prevent the ^ 
of Lehi from entering into a conditio^ 
sales contract for the purchase or 
tain electrical equipment. The obje ^ 
was made that since the act sought _ { 
enjoined was purely ministerial the ^ 
G<f prohibition should not issue, the ^ -
\ 
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' inisterial in nature was unconstitutional, 
! kpcause it attempted to extend the scope 
j f the writ. The court noted several 
I
 ses including Camron v. Kenfield, 57 
\fyl 550, and Maurer v. Mitchell, ^53 
• 'CaL 289, in which the California Su-
relBe Court had held that a similar pro-
, vision in the California Constitution re-
ferred to the writ as it existed at the 
,
 common law. Under this holding a Cali-
: (ornia statute (identical to the Utah ter-
ritorial statute authorizing the issuance of 
jjje writ) was held unconstitutional be-
cause it attempted to enlarge the scope 
,
 0f the common law writ to arrest the do-
[ jn2; of acts purely ministerial in nature. 
| 
[ These California cases were distin-
| auished by the Utah Court because Cali-
1
 fornia had never in its history before state-
i hood permitted the issuance of a writ 
broader in scope than that of the com-
j mon law. There was no other writ, ex-
I cept the common law writ, to which the 
Constitution of California could have 
referred. 
[ The court further noted in Barnes v. 
Lehi City, supra, that had the Utah Or-
ganic Act referred specifically to the writ 
' of prohibition, it might be argued that 
by so specifying the writ, it was intended 
to confine its functions to those only at-
tending the common law writ. The court 
! concluded: 
j "We confidently believe that the 
| fr&mers of the Constitution in conferring 
authority upon the Supreme Court to is-
I sue the writ of prohibition, had in mind 
| a writ the character and functions of 
| which were the same as defined by the 
| statute of the territory which was then in 
j existence, and had been in existence for 
f II years, and which had been recognized 
I and approved by the courts of the ter-
I ritory, and thus, as was said by the Su-
j'preme Court of South Dakota, in State 
y. Ewert, 36 S. D. 622, 156 N. W . 90, 
to take a forward step and to extend 
The court then field mat me wru wouia 
properly issue to inferior boards, corpora-
tions or persons whether exercising func-
tions judicial or ministerial. 
The issuance of the writ to arrest the 
performance of a purely ministerial act is 
now apparently well established 8 as 
is the holding that the writ specified in 
the Constitution is the same writ as was 
in existence in the territory at the time 
the Constitution was adopted—which 
writ was somewhat broader in scope than 
the common law writ. Note however that 
up to this time all of the cases gave lip 
service to the principle laid down so em-
phatically in State v. Durand that the 
Constitution froze into the writ of pro-
hibition the requirement that it "be issued 
only to arrest proceedings without or iiT) 
excess of jurisdiction and that it issue > 
only where there was no other remedy; ) 
that any attempt to enlarge the scope of 
the writ so as to eliminate these require-
ments would be unconstitutional. As al-
ready noted, it had been held as early 
as 1 896 that the Constitution deprived the 
Supreme Court of jurisdiction to enter-
tain appeals except from final judgments. 
9
 Thus there was no mechanism for 
intermediate review. Regardless of the 
hardship, if the inferior court had juris-
diction to proceed, the injured litigant 
must await a final judgment before pro-
ceedings could be had to review error. If 
he were compelled to wait final judg-
ment, the threatened injury sought to be 
prevented would have occurred and the 
litigant would have been placed in a 
position from which he could never ob-
tain relief even though he ultimately were 
to prevail. The extraordinary writs like 
(8) Cottrell v. Millard County Drain. Dist., 
56 Utah 375, 119 P. 16.6; Livingston v. Millard 
County Drain. Dist. No. 3, 58 Utah 382, 199 P . 
661 ; Moyle v. Board of Commissioners of Salt 
Lake ounty, '53 Utah 35i2, 178 P. 918; Van 
Orden v. Board of Education of Cache County 
School Dist., 66 Utah 4!30, 191 P. 230; Booth v. 
Midvale City, 55 Utah 220, U84 P. 799; Hartley 
v. State Road Comm., 53 Utah 589, 174 P. 629; 
Olsen v. Merrill, 78 Utah 453, 5 P. 2d 26i&; 
Washington County v. Tax Commission, 103 Utah 
73. 133 P. 2d 564. 
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certorari and prohibition could only be 
used where the lower tribunal was pro-
ceeding without or in excess of jurisdic-
tion. Appeals could only be taken from 
Final judgments. * And the Constitution 
/vas construed to prohibit the enlargement 
)f the scope of the writs and to prohibit 
he taking of appeals from anything ex-
cept final judgments. The result was of 
purse inevitable. Lawyers sought means 
o stay the harsh results of such "hold-
igs. The extraordinary writs were tried 
ven though there was no want of juris-
iction. Courts were inclined to ignore the 
ne distinctions between jurisdiction and 
rror. Likewise, when appeals were 
rought from intermediate orders, the 
>urts were inclined to consider the judg-
ent to be final. The distinction be-
reen jurisdictional and plain error and 
;tween judgments which were final and 
ose which were not became confused, 
fact even had the line between final 
d non-final judgments not been so 
irred, it would have in some cases been 
tremely difficult to know when one had 
appealable judgment. 
This state of affairs was analyzed in 
wood v. Cox, 88 Utah 426, 55 P. 
377. In that case there was discussed 
length the necessity of the court taking
 t 
[nizance, on applications for jprohibi-
i and certiorari, of errors where the 
sequences of the erroneous ruling 
ild otherwise be irremedial. The lack 
mechanism for timely review of such 
rigs was noted. It was frankly admitted 
: this situation had led our Supreme 
irt and those of practically all other 
>dictions to consider such rulings on 
s of certiorari and prohibiiton where 
eality only error and not jurisdiction 
involved. 
ittention should be called to the fact 
in this case a majority of the court 
not affirmatively concur in the dis-
on in that case distinguishing jurisdic-
1 from plain error. While paying 
to the decision. Consequently, that discus-
sion embedded in the Atwood case was 
not abstracted in the headnotes and the 
case must be read to discover it. However, 
the case has been cited man)' times since 
in the opinions of our Supreme Court for 
its conclusions in this regard. It is 
thought to have become a part of the 
law of this jurisdiction. 
It was noted that in most cases the 
writ had not issued except where a lack of 
jurisdiction was shown. Yet: 
"In a comparatively small number of 
cases where the writ was granted, it was 
quite evident that the court was influ-
enced by the fact that if it did not act 
to prevent the threatened action by the 
lower court, ijrrgmediab]e_. harm woiila 
have been jdone. The lower courts either 
ignored the distinction between what was 
merely error and excess of power or, as 
in the Montana case in 56 Pacific Re-
)porter above cited, managed to* see 4an 
| erroneous ruling of the lower court as m 
I excess of jurisdiction, or else confused 
the reasoning^ that it is difficult to de-
termine upon what ground the court aid 
decide. In a still smaller number of cases 
the line which separated the erroneous 
action of a court in its legitimate judicial 
field from actions in a field in excess of 
its powers was so difficult to draw tnat 
minds might go one way or the other m 
drawing conclusions. . . 
"In-a number of jurisdictions where a 
"threatened interlocutory or intermediate 
order involving some affirmative action 
of the lower court in reference to prop-
erty, status, relationship, or rights of Par" 
ties in respect to property was o?f such 
nature as to destroy the status quo an 
render an appeal or other remedy &e~ 
fectual to undo the mischief, the 'courts 
have issued the writ of prohibition a-
'fill-in' in order to prevent the threat-
ened mischief most times not giving ] ^ 
sons therefor except to say categoric* > 
that the court below was threatening 
exceed its "jurisdiction or indicial po*ve. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
• [n conclusion it was noted that the 
s could not be reconciled so as to 
\~ Jown a definite rule of guidance, but: 
"What can be said is that ordinarily 
I - Superior court will look only to see 
•f the lower court was acting without or 
I *
 excess of jurisdiction, and if so, wheth-
» [Here is still not some adequate and 
!
 eedy remedy, but that, in certain sit-
I uations where it would work a palpable 
j^ustice or hardship or cause damage 
which could not be checked or remedied 
jn any other way, the superior court will 
n0t go too refinedly into the questions as 
t0 what constitutes error merely or lack 
or excess of jurisdiction before issuing 
. the writ." , 
Some of the specific illustrations set out 
jn Atwood Y, Cox as to when the courts 
will and when they will not grant the writ 
may better be discussed below. Suffice 
it here to note that it was expressly re-
. cognized in the opinion in Atwood v. 
! Cox that the writ of prohibition could 
1 under certain named circumstances be used 
as a proceeding for an intermediate review 
and that in so using the writ courts will 
[ not go too 'refinedly into the question of 
v
 jurisdiction. 
This is perhaps as good a point as any 
; to note that in some situations it is quite 
difficult to determine whether a require-
r merit is a condition to jurisdiction or 
• whether it is mandatory on the court 
: acting within jurisdiction or for that mat-
' ter only directionary. Sometimes it may 
1
 make little difference in the result wheth-
] er such distinction is made for as we 
shall see in the matter of issuing a writ of 
prohibition the controlling element is the 
; adequacy of a remedy by appeal. But 
j% in cases of habeas corpus, it may be ne-
|: cessary definitely to determine the line 
[which bounds the area between jurisdic-
|-tonal error and error committed within 
k the. exercise of correctly assumed jurisdic-
\. tion. See Thompson v. Harris, 1 06 Utah 
|32y 144 P 2d 701. 
ing of the North Point Consol. Orr. Co. 
v. Utah & S. L. Canal Co., case, supra, 
to the effect that appeals could, under the 
Constitution, only be entertained from 
final judgments. The hardships resulting 
from the lack of some mechanism for an 
intermediate review was again discussed* 
The court, while still adhering to the an-
cient and salutary policy of the law 
against piecemeal reviews, overruled the 
North Point case in so far as it con-
strued the Constitution as limiting the 
jurisdiction of the Court to appeals from 
only final judgments. The court said: 
". . . . we hold that section 9 of ar-
. tide 8 of the Constitution was a guaranty 
and not a restriction on the right of the 
litigant to appeal. Likewise, section 1 04-
41-1, R. S. Utah 1933, was intended 
not to prevent this court from ever enter-
taining an appeal from other than what 
is technically a final judgment, but was 
meant to assure the right at all events 
from final judgments. We, however, ad-
here to the doctrine and policy of the 
law, as stated by Mr. Justice Lamar in 
.McLish v. Pvoff, 141 U. S. 661, 12 S. 
Ct. 118, 35 L. Ed. 893 , 'a case cannot 
be brought to this court in fragments' and 
that ordinarily a case will be dismissed 
where the appeal is not from a final 
judgment. . . we do not think a final judg-
ment is a condition precedent to our jur-
isdiction, but is a condition precedent ex--
cept in rare instances to our entertaining 
the appeal because of the ancient policy 
of the law based on sound principles." 
The situation which prompted the court 
to entertain the appeal in the Pomeroy 
case is considerably involved and would 
be difficult to keep in mind if I should 
attempt to state the situation there in-
volved and perhaps not of sufficient mo-
ment though the Pomeroy case contains am 
interesting decision as to what is an ap-
pealable (final) judgment which sub-
ject is related to the subject here being 
considered. Furthermore it contains some 
tests for the determination of an appeal-
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Later the court again permitted an 
appeal from an interlocutory judgment 
granting a temporary injunction in the 
case of Wellsville East Field Irr. Com-
pany v. Lindsay Land and Livestock Cq. 
et al, 104 Utah 448, 137 P . 2d 634. 
In that case the plaintiffs sought injunc-
tive relief to prevent several defendants 
from taking water for irrigation from a 
particular source. After hearing the evi-
dence the court entered its order, which 
it denominated an interlocutory order, re-
straining the defendants from using the 
water. The trial judge then ordered that 
the case be turned over to the State En-
gineer for a general adjudication of the 
water rights on the whole stream. The 
result was that the defendants, some of 
whom had used the water for the past 
40 years, were enjoined from using it 
further. No final judgment was entered 
from which they could appeal. The gen-
eral adjudication procedure is time con-
summing and it might have taken upwards 
of ten years to complete it. Meantime the 
defendants under the order must let their 
farms lie arid unless an appeal from the 
interlocutory order was allowed. Defen-
dants appealed and the court denied a 
motion to dismiss based on the fact that 
the judgment was not a final judgment. 
These factors are not discussed in the 
opinion in the Wellsville case. They are 
however noted in a concurring opinion in 
Watson v. District Court, Utah 
163 P . 2d. 322, which involved a writ 
of prohibition on another phase of the 
same case. In all probability appeals from 
certain intermediary judgments in general 
adjudication of river systems would be 
permissible even without the authority of 
the Pomeroy case. Such suits are of long 
duration, take in many facts, contain 
within the over arching suit many inde-
pendent and local controversies which, 
ike probate procedure, in the very na-
ure of the case require the opportunity 
o appeal and which may be in them-
elves as between the parties concerned in 
he local suit, final or at Ip^ Qf- ksv^ fk*> 
tion Co. v. Hooper Irrigation Co. et al 
87 U t 5 4 5 ; 51 P . (2d) 1069. 
On February 15, 1946, in the case 
of Graham v. Street—Utah—166 P, 
(2d) 524 the court again entertained an 
appeal from an interlocutory decree order-
ing an accounting between partners. The 
court noted that the appeal was enter-
tained under the authority of Attorney 
General v. Pomeroy, supra. 
It appears thus to be now firmly es-
tablished that the court will, where the 
facts warrant it, entertain an appeal from [ 
an intermediate order. It also appears that 
the writ of prohibition can be used as an 
intermediate writ of review where facts 
warrant it. The rule is thus stated in 
Mayers v. Bronson, 100 Utah 279, 114 ] 
P . 2d 2 1 3 : 
"We have held that even where there 
is jurisdiction we will entertain the ap-
plication for the writ if there is no plain, 
speedy and adequate remedy at law. At-
wood v. Cox, supra, we have also held : 
even where there is no jurisdiction but 
a plain, speedy and adequate remedy 
at law, we will not entertain the writ. 
Hense the important question is: Is there 
an adequate remedy at law?" 
And Olson v. District Court, 106 
Utah 220, 147 P. 2d. 471, where* 
the court said: 
"In addition to the purpose above 
mentioned, the function of the writ 
prohibition has been extended, under o 
law, to cover situations where, e 
though the lower tribunal has jurisdiction, 
the court deems it necessary and a . 
able to issue the writ to PreventRS°.mjt 
palpable and irremedial injustice. # 
is settled beyond dispute that if ^ e .
 ol 
court has jurisdiction, prohibition i* . -/ 
a proper remedy if a remedy a l \ \ 
adequate. It requires but a moment s. ^ 
flection to reveal that for the rule to \ ; 
make otherwise would any lawsuit *£:• Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Whether the remedy available is ade-
*** for the most part, rests in the sound 
\-rretion or the court. What is meant discrete 
by . discretion of the court" relative to 1 jssuance of prohibition discussed in 
5ome detail in Broadbent v. Gibson, 105 | ^ah 53, 140 P. 2d. 939. The court 
i-there.said: 
!•/• " 'Discretion' does not mean happy 
j fortuitous choice, but a discretion guid-
r j by circumstances surrounding the liti-
aatio<n. If the term 'adequate remedy' 
were an absolute, it might be incorrect 
$ say that we could ever grant the writ 
where there was another adequate reme-
1
 Jy. But 'adequate remedy' is a matter 
i
 0f degree and may run the gamut of sit-
:
 uatians at one end where he could not 
retrieve himself, (Atwood v. Cox) to 
situations on the ether hand where not 
jo grant the' writ would leave the peti-
••tioner where there were no factors of 
hardship other than those which attend 
the ordinary judgment and appeal. In 
between situations may arise where, in a 
single case at bar, there appears to be a 
remedy adequate in the ordinary course 
of the law, but where there are urgent 
public questions or question of public 
policy involved directly or indirectly re-
lated or dependent upon the outcome, or 
wtere the urgent rights of a large group 
of the public await the resolution of the 
question, or where a multiplicity of suits 
threaten, or where some factors, either 
intrinsic or extrinsic to the litigation, re-
veal the ordinary course of Law really not 
k adequate although on the face of things 
it may technically appear to be. In those 
cases the writ may issue in the sound dis-
cretion of the court. Perhaps another way 
of stating the proposition would be to say 
that such circumstances involve a con-
tradiction and ^actually defeat 'the ade-
quacy of the /remedy at law—render it 
not so. In the last analysis, adequacy of 
legal remedy may be under certain cir-
cumstances a matter far reasonable dif-
1 vw s*iir*l> s>r\r*At* •» 4- in/Are^ 
said to have issued in the sound discre-
tion of the court, even though other minds 
might have reasonably concluded that the 
legal remedy was adequate. But 'sound 
discretion' must always be labelled with 
the precautionary admonition that the writ 
is for extraordinary occasions and should 
be sparingly used." -
We turn now to an examination of 
seme of the factors which control the is-
suance of the writ. First: it is clearly es-
tablished that the mere delay and expense 
of an ordinary appeal affords no grounds 
for the issuance of the writ. This was 
stated as follows in Construction Sec. 
Co. v. Dist. Court, 85 Utah 346, 39 P. 
2d 707: 
"Where there is an adequate remedy in \ 
the ordinary course of law, the writ is 
not demandable as a matter of right, but 
will issue only in the exercise of a sound 
judicial discretion. . . (citing cases). . . 
To justify a departure from the general 
rule thus announced, some extraordinary 
circumstances or extreme emergency or 
4
 necessity must appear, such that the court 
ought, in the exercise of a sound discre-
tion, to invoke this extraordinary remedy. 
The mere necessary • delay and expense of 
an (appeal 'ordinarily furnish no sufficient 
reasons for holding that the remedy 
by appeal is not adequate or speedy. T o 
hold otherwise is to hold that all appeals 
are not adequate or speedy, for all in-
volve some delay and expense'." ^ 
And in Broadbent v. Gibson, supra, 
the court noted that "one of the risks 
of all citizenry is that they must submit 
to the law as it is declared until it is 
repealed csr found invalid even though it 
entails some loss or inconvenience." , 
Second: the lower tribunal must have 
its alleged excess of jurisdiction pointed 
out to it and be given an opportunity to 
rule thereon before application' is made 
for a' writ of prohibition. This is because 
1lf
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operative v. Wiesley, 102 Utah 6 0 1 , 
132 P . 2d 384, the writ was refused 
even though the court concluded that the 
Utah Labor Board had no jurisdiction 
to" proceed because no application was 
first made to the Bioard for relief. The 
:ourt noted: 
"If we were to proceed on the theory 
:hat the lower tribunal would commit. 
*rror when a petitioner properly demand-
ed the protection of his rights, we would 
)e required to hold all remedies short of 
i'ome action by this court to be inadequate. 
. .^ It should be a fundamental canon 
)f judicial conduct to avoid interference 
vith administrative proceedings until it is 
certain that the proceedings which im-
ninently threaten to infringe the rights of 
he petitioner will not be corrected by the 
idministrative tribunal. Otherwise the 
:orurts would be called upon to arrest the 
>roceedings of such- tribunals by the use 
>f an extraordinary writ even though the 
lecessity for the issuance thereof might 
^ave been obviated if a proper motion 
o dismiss had been made before the said 
ribunal. In fact, until the Board acts 
otherwise, we will, assume that it will act 
orrectly when and if a proper motion 
o dismiss is made." 
This was. followed in Olson v. Dis-
rict Court, supra, wherein the petitioner 
ailed to permit the lower court to rule on 
le questions raised before applying for 
le writ. See also State ex rel Welling 
vDist. Court, 87 Utah 416, 49 P." 2d 
50, where the court held that the trial 
ourt should have been given an opportun-
y to rule upon the motion for a new trial 
efore the writ of prohibition would is-
le. And Van Cott v. Turner, 88 Utah 
35, 56 P . 2d 16, wherein the court 
lid that "a writ of prohibition will lie 
ily in cases of manifest necessity and 
fter a fruitless application for relief to 
te inferior tribunal." 
Third: The failure to state a cause of 
:tion in the uleadm^ invoking lower 
Cox, supra, where the court said: 
"The court to which application for a 
writ of prohibition is directed will not try 
out the question of the sufficiency of a 
complaint or information where the com-
plaint car information states sufficient facts 
to apprise the court in which the action 
has been brought as to whether it has jur-
isdiction of the general subject-matter in 
respect to which the pleadings seek to in-
voke its jurisdiction in the particular case 
endeavored to be set forth by the plead-
ings. . . exceptions to this rule have been 
made. .• . in criminal cases or in cases 
where an accusation is filed to remove a | 
public officer from his office;. . .' 
However, in Furbreeders Agr. Coop. 
v. Wiesley, supra, the court held that be-'t 
fore a tribunal of limited jurisdiction the | 
pleading -must aver the necessary jurisqio 
tional facts and that if the jurisdictiona 
facts are not alleged, then the tribunal tas ,. 
no jurisdiction to proceed except to decide 
that it has no jurisdiction. 
It may be incidentally noted that a | 
petition for a writ of prohibition maybe 
treated as an application for an injunction 
if it is filed originally with the distnc 
court. Broadbent v. Gibson, supra. AW 
the writ of prohibition may be treated a> 
a writ of certiorari. Clark v. .Bramei, 
Utah 146, 192 P . 11 11. See also Hott- | 
manv. Lewis, 31 Utah 179, 87 P. «Wj j 
And a writ of certiorari may be tre j 
as a writ of prohibition Thomas VA »*\ J 
Ct. 171 P . 2d 667. It thus appear » | 
the form of the application for r e l i e f | 
be generally disregarded and the pe ^ 
er may be awarded the relief to wni ^ 
pleadings show that he is entitled so 
as the application is filed in a court 
ing proper original jurisdiction. 
Brief reference to the cases m fa 
the writ issued serves to demonstra^^ 
type of hardship that is required. ln -^ 4 
ers v. Bronson, supra, the PetlS°j'ng$,4i&\j| 
thre.atpnp.d with contempt procee *
 f ^M 
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I Tax Commission subpoena. Petitioner 
1 \ imed that he was not required by lav/ 
I c appear. He applied to the Supreme 
r art for prohibition. The contention was 
de that he had an adequate remedy 
f
 appeal. The court held to the con-
0
* because in order to appeal he had 
I'fst to refuse to purge himself of the 
I nternpt as ordered by the court, that is 
refiise to appear before the commission 
ke had been ordered to do by the 
ourt. If ^e w e r e then held by the Su-
reIpe Court to have been wrong in his 
efusal he would have been subject to 
'jnprisonment for contempt. The court 
thought that no man need run that risk 
| jn order to test his right to refuse to an-
swer to what he considered to be an ille; 
cral order. 
0 
]n Adolpll Coors Co. v. Liquor Control 
Commission, 99 Utah 246, 105 P. 2d 
|81, the defendant would have been re-
quired either indefinitely to comply with 
an order of the Liquor Control Com-
mission which he thought to be void or 
\o disobey the order and thus hazard 
, criminal prosecution and forfeiture of his 
license. Possibly he could have had re-
course to the declaratory judgment pro-
cedure to test the validity of the order, 
but this point was neither raised nor dis-
cussed. 
In Allen v. Lindbeck, 97 Utah 471 , 
i 93 P. 920, the lower tribunal (a justice 
I of the peace) wras acting without jur~ 
| isdicticn. The Supreme Court noted that 
in such cases it had a discretion to grant 
the writ even though it appeared that 
there was another adequate remedy. This 
is, however, limited to cases where the 
I lower tribunal is proceeding without or 
I in excess of jurisdiction. The case in-
I volved a seizure of milk bottles from the 
: petitioner and an attempt by a justice's 
I court to determine title to the bottles under 
J an unconstitutional statute. The court not-
| $d that the case had a quasi-criminal as-
court without jurisdiction, made the writ 
permanent. 
The criminal case referred to in Allen 
v. Lindbeck, supra, is People v. Spiers, 
4 Utah 385, 10 P . 609, U P . 509. 
The petitioner there was being tried by 
a justice's court for a crime over which 
it had no jurisdiction. The defendant ap-
plied for a writ of prohibition which is-
sued. The contention was made that the 
writ should be dismissed because of the 
remedy by appeal. The court said: 
"To compel a party to submit to being 
forced through this tedious and harassing 
routine of- illegal proceeding and usurped 
jurisdiction is not only expensive and 
troublesome, but also vexatious in the* ex-
teme, and ought not to be allowed if it 
can be prevented. If there be no remedy 
by writ of prohibition in a misdemeanor 
case, by reason, of there being an appeal, 
there is none in a felony case. . . A party 
charged with any offense has the right 
to have it investigated in a proper court, 
and in a logical manner, and cannot be 
compelled to submit to an illegal and un-
authorized investigation. . . he is entitled 
to have a judgment that he may plead 
in any subsequent proceedings upon the 
same charge. No citizen should be ar-
rested and prosecuted before a court hav-
ing no authority to hear, try, or determine 
the case/ ' 
In Home Owners' Loan Gorooration 
v. Logan City, 97 Utah ,235, 92 P . 
(2d) 346, upon a writ of mandamus it 
was held that the remedy of paying a 
sum of money under protest and a suit 
to recover it was not an adequate remedy 
to compel a municipal corporation to fur-
nish domestic water to an inhabitant of 
said city. v 
In Broadbent v. Gibson, supra, and 
Washington County •v. County Tax Com. 
103 Utah 73, 133 P . (2d) 564, the 
fact that the question presented had a 
nublic interest phase concerning the rights 
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not the writ should issue. 
By way of summary it would appear 
) that if the lower tribunal is without 
risdiction or is proceding in excess of 
jurisdiction and there is no adequate 
nedy, the writ should issue as a matter 
right; (2) if the lower tribunal is 
>ceding without jurisdiction, but it ap~ 
irs that there is an adequate remedy, 
writ should generally not issue but the 
irt is not entirely without discretion; 
Jlen v. Lindbeck, supra, is an exam-
.) (3 ) If the lower tribunal has juris-
tion but it appears that by an erroneous 
er it has placed one party in a posi-
i where he will be irreparably injured 
! that he has no adequate remedy to 
rent the injury or retrieve his loss, then 
court may in the exercise of its 
id discretion use the writ as a proce-
2 for intermediate review: (Atwood 
^ox, supra; Meyers v. Bronson, supra, 
examples) and (4) if there is no 
i or excess of jurisdiction and there 
h adequate remedy, the writ should 
never issue, 
example.) 
(State v. Olson, supra, is 
It thus appears that by the cases of 
Atwood v. Cox, supra, and subsequent 
cases based upon it, together with the 
case of Attorney General v. Pomeroy, 
supra, the Supreme Court is in position 
to. entertain an intermediary review either 
through the instrumentality of the writ of 
prohibition or by direct appeal from an 
interlocutory ruling where the exigencies 
of the situation demand it. But the court 
will not in any case either grant the writ 
no-r entertain an appeal from an interlo-
cutory order where the situation is such* 
as will abide the event of final judgment. 
In those cases where there is both lack 
or excess of jurisdiction and the element 
of irretrievability the court grants the writ 
or entertains an appeal. In other cases the 
entertainment of the appeal before final 
judgment or the issuance of the writ will 
be in the- discretion of the court, which 
discretion will depend on factors dealing' 
with irretrievability, hazard and public 
interest and importance. 
. • far 
In the development of our liberty, in-
sistence upon procedural regularity has 
been a large factor." 
Justice Louis D. Brandeis 
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Article VIII, Section 3. [Jurisdiction of Supreme Court] 
The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to answer 
questions of state law certified by a court of the United States. The Supreme Court shall have appellate 
jurisdiction over all other matters to be exercised as provided by statute, and power to issue all writs and 
orders necessary for the exercise of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction or the complete determination of 
any cause. 
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e 4-803. Trials de novo in small claims cases. 
it: 
stablish uniform procedures governing trials de novo of small claims actions. 
licability: 
rule shall apply to the trial de novo of small claims actions. 
*mentoftheRule: 
leneral provisions. 
light to trial de novo. Any party to a judgment in a small claims action may appeal the judgment in accordance with 
ion 78-6-10. The appeal shall be by trial de novo. 
fenue. The trial de novo of a justice court adjudication shall be heard in the district court location nearest to and in 
ame county as the justice court from which the appeal is taken. The trial de novo from the small claims department 
e district court shall be held at the same district court location. Either party may move for a change of venue under 
pplicable Rules of Civil Procedure. 
mall claims appeals. 
iling notice of appeal. Either party may appeal a small claims judgment by filing a notice of appeal in the court 
ng the judgment within ten days of the notice of entry of the judgment. 
ontents of notice of appeal. The notice of appeal shall designate the district court location in which the trial de 
will be held, shall specify the parties in their original capacity, shall identify the party obtaining the trial de novo, 
shall designate the judgment and the court from which theappeal is taken. 
ervice of notice of appeal. The appellant shall give notice of the filing of the notice of appeal by personally serving 
ailing a copy to the counsel of record of each party to the judgment, or, if a party is not represented by counsel, then 
B party at his last known address. The appellant shall file proof of service or mailing with the district court 
ees. At the time of filing the notice of appeal, the appellant must deposit into court issuing the judgment the fees 
dished under Utah Code Ann. Section 21-1-5 and Section 78-6-14. The payment of the filing fee is necessary for 
wring jurisdiction upon the district court. Payment of filing fees may be waived upon filing of an affidavit of 
cuniosity pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 21-7-3. 
tay of judgment. A judgment is automatically stayed upon the filing of a notice of appeal with the court issuing the 
nent and the posting of a supersedeas bond with the district court. The stay shall continue until the entry of the 
nent or final order of the district court. 
rocedures - Record of justice court. Within ten days of the filing of the notice of appeal in a justice court, the court 
transmit to the district court the notice of appeal, the district court fees, a certified copy of the docket or register of 
ns, and the original of ail pleadings, notices, motions, orders, judgment, and other papers filed in the case. 
rders governing trials de novo. Upon the filing of the notice of appeal, the district court shall issue all further orders 
rning the trial de novo. 
isposition. The trial de novo shall be tried in accordance with the procedures of small claims actions. The 
cement, collection or satisfaction of a judgment shall be according to district court procedures. Upon the entry of 
idgment or final order of the district court, the clerk of the district court shall transmit to the justice court which 
*red the original judgment notice of the manner of disposition of the case. Such notice shall be for informational 
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(e)(4) There is a substantial likelihood that the applicant 
will prevail on the merits of the underlying claim, or the case 
presents serious issues on the merits which should be the 
subject of further litigation. 
(f) Domestic relations cases. Nothing in this rule shall be 
construed to limit the equitable powers of the courts in 
domestic relations cases. 
Rule 65B. Extraordinary relief. 
(a) Availability of remedy. Where no other plain, speedy and 
adequate remedy is available, a person may petition the court 
for extraordinary relief on any of the grounds set forth in 
paragraph (b) (involving wrongful restraint on personal lib-
erty), paragraph (c) (involving the wrongful use of public or 
corporate authority) or paragraph (d) (involving the wrongful 
use of judicial authority, the failure to exercise such authority, 
and actions by the Board of Pardons and Parole). There shall 
be no special form of writ. Except for instances governed by 
Rule 65C, the procedures in this rule shall govern proceedings 
on all petitions for extraordinary relief. To the extent that this 
rule does not provide special procedures, proceedings on 
petitions for extraordinary relief shall be governed by the 
procedures set forth elsewhere in these rules. 
(b) Wrongful restraints on personal liberty. 
(b)(1) Scope. Except for instances governed by Rule 65C, 
this paragraph shall govern all petitions claiming that a 
person has been wrongfully restrained of personal liberty, and 
the court may grant relief appropriate under this paragraph. 
(b)(2) Commencement. The proceeding shall be commenced 
by filing a petition with the clerk of the court in the district in 
which the petitioner is restrained or the respondent resides or 
in which the alleged restraint is occurring. 
(b)(3) Contents of the petition and attachments. The petition 
shall contain a short, plain statement of the facts on the basis 
of which the petitioner seeks relief. It shall identify the 
respondent and the place where the person is restrained. It 
shall state the cause or pretense of the restraint, if known by 
the petitioner. It shall state whether the legality of the 
restraint has already been adjudicated in a prior proceeding 
and, if so, the reasons for the denial of relief in the prior 
proceeding. The petitioner shall attach to the petition any 
legal process available to the petitioner that resulted in 
restraint. The petitioner shall also attach to the petition a 
copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior 
proceeding that adjudicated the legality of the restraint. 
(b)(4) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not 
set forth argument or citations or discuss authorities in the 
petition, but these may be set out in a separate memorandum, 
two copies of which shall be filed with the petition. 
(b)(5) Dismissal of frivolous claims. On review of the peti-
tion, if it is apparent to the court that the legality of the 
restraint has already been adjudicated in a prior proceeding, 
or if for any other reason any claim in the petition shall appear 
frivolous on its face, the court shall forthwith issue an order 
dismissing the claim, stating that the claim is frivolous on its 
face and the reasons for this conclusion. The order need not 
state findings of fact or conclusions of law. The order shall be 
sent by mail to the petitioner. Proceedings on the claim shall 
terminate with the entry of the order of dismissal. 
(b)(6) Responsive pleadings. If the petition is not dismissed 
as being frivolous on its face, the court shall direct the clerk of 
the court to serve a copy of the petition and a copy of any 
memorandum upon the respondent by mail. At the same time, 
the court may issue an order directing the respondent to 
answer or otherwise respond to the petition, specifying a time 
within which the respondent must comply. If the circum-
legality of the restraint. An answer to a petition shall stat 
plainly whether the respondent has restrained the perso: 
alleged to have been restrained, whether the person so re 
strained has been transferred to any other person, and if sc 
the identity of the transferee, the date of the transfer, and th 
reason or authority for the transfer. Nothing in this paragraph 
shall be construed to prohibit the court from ruling upon th 
petition based upon a dispositive motion. 
(b)(7) Temporary relief. If it appears that the person allege* 
to be restrained will be removed from the court's jurisdictio] 
or will suffer irreparable injury before compliance with th 
hearing order can be enforced, the court shall issue a warran 
directing the sheriff to bring the respondent before the court t 
be dealt with according to law. Pending a determination of th 
petition, the court may place the person alleged to have beei 
restrained in the custody of such other persons as may b« 
appropriate. 
(b)(8) Alternative service of the hearing order. If the respon 
dent cannot be found, or if it appears that a person other thai 
the respondent has custody of the person alleged to be re 
strained, the hearing order and any other process issued h 
the court may be served on the person having custody in tin 
manner and with -the same effect as if that person had beei 
named as respondent in the action. 
(b)(9) Avoidance of service by respondent. If anyone havinj 
custody of the person alleged to be restrained avoids service o 
the hearing order or attempts wrongfully to remove the persoi 
from the court's jurisdiction, the sheriff shall immediately 
arrest the responsible person. The sheriff shall forthwitl 
bring the person arrested before the court to be dealt witl 
according to law. 
(b)(10) Hearing or other proceedings. In the event that th< 
court orders a hearing, the court shall hear the matter in i. 
summary fashion and shall render judgment accordingly. The 
respondent or other person having custody shall appear witl 
the person alleged to be restrained or shall state the reason* 
for failing to do so. The court may nevertheless direct th< 
respondent to bring before it the person alleged to be re 
strained. If the petitioner waives the right to be present at th< 
hearing, the court shall modify the hearing order accordingly 
The hearing order shall not be disobeyed for any defect of forn 
or any misdescription in the order or the petition, if enough ii 
stated to impart the meaning and intent of the proceeding ti 
the respondent. 
(c) Wrongful use of or failure to exercise public authority. 
(c)(1) Who may petition the court; security. The attorne; 
general may, and when directed to do so by the governor shall 
petition the court for relief on the grounds enumerated in thi 
paragraph. Any person who is not required to be represents 
by the attorney general and who is aggrieved or threatened b; 
one of the acts enumerated in subparagraph (2) of thi 
paragraph may petition the court under this paragraph if (A 
the person claims to be entitled to an office unlawfully held b 
another or (B) if the attorney general fails to file a petitioi 
under this paragraph after receiving notice of the person5 
claim. A petition filed by a person other than the attorne 
general under this paragraph shall be brought in the name c 
the petitioner, and the petition shall be accompanied by a 
undertaking with sufficient sureties to pay any judgment fc 
costs and damages that may be recovered against the peti 
tioner in the proceeding. The sureties shall be in the form fo 
bonds on appeal provided for in Rule 73. 
(c)(2) Grounds for relief. Appropriate relief may be grantee 
(A) where a person usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully hold 
or exercises a public office, whether civil or military, a frar 
chise, or an office in a corporation created by the authority c 
the state of Utah; (B) where a public officer does or permit 
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>) Upon full payment of the judgment including post-judgment costs and 
rest, the prevailing party shall promptly file a Satisfaction of Judgment 
•m J) with the court. 
) The court may enter a Satisfaction of Judgment at the request of a party 
r ten calendar days notice to all parties. 
led effective November 1, 2001.) 
le 12. Appeals. 
) Either party may appeal a small claims judgment within ten business 
3 (not counting weekends and holidays) of receipt of notice of entry of 
pnent. 
) To appeal, the appealing party must file a Notice of Appeal (Form K) in, 
court issuing the judgment and mail a copy to each party. The appropriate 
mist accompany the Notice of Appeal. 
) On appeal, a new trial will be held ("trial de novo"). 
led effective November 1, 2001.) legally incorporated; (D) where any corporation has violated : 
the laws of the state of Utah relating to the creation, alter-
\ ation or renewal of corporations; or (E) where any corporation 
has forfeited or misused its corporate rights, privileges or 
-• • • franchises. 
(c)(3) Proceedings on the petition. On the filing of a petition, 
the court may require that notice be given to adverse parties 
before issuing a hearing order, or may issue a hearing order 
A requiring the adverse party to appear at the hearing on the 
, • i "
 / _ _ ' \ merits. The court may also grant temporary relief in accor-
, O H T \ n ^ < ^ T \ O T \ O T . dance with the terms of Rule 65A. 
(d) Wrongful use of judicial authority or failure to comply 
with duty; actions by board of pardons and parole. 
(d)(1) Who may petition. A person aggrieved or whose 
interests are threatened by any of the acts enumerated in this 
paragraph may petition the court for relief. 
(d)(2) Grounds for relief. Appropriate relief may be granted: 
(A) where an inferior court, administrative agency, or officer 
exercising judicial functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or 
abused its discretion; (B) where an inferior court, administra-
tive agency, corporation or person has failed to perform an act 
required by law as a duty of office, trust or station; (C) where 
an inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or person 
has refused the petitioner the use or enjoyment of a right or 
office to which the petitioner is entitled; or (D) where the 
Board of Pardons and Parole has exceeded its jurisdiction or 
failed to perform an act required by constitutional or statutory 
law. 
(d)(3) Proceedings on the petition. On the filing of a petition, 
the court may require that notice be given to adverse parties 
before issuing a hearing order, or may issue a hearing order 
requiring the adverse party to appear at the hearing on the * 
merits. The court may direct the inferior court, administrative 
agency, officer, corporation or other person named as respon-
dent to deliver to the court a transcript or other record of the 
proceedings. The court may also grant temporary relief in 
accordance with the terms of Rule 65A. 
(d)(4) Scope of review. Where the challenged proceedings 
are judicial in nature, the court's review shall not extend 
J-VcxK R u W o? C i v i l 
G5$ 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - TOOELE COURT 
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CLIFTON PANOS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JENNIFER ANN CASTLE, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
PTC/ MOTION TO DISMISS 
Case No: 038300082 ST 
Judge: RANDALL SKANCHY 
Date: March 17, 2003 
Clerk: 
PRESENT 
tawnil 
Plaintiff(s): CLIFTON PANOS 
Defendant's Attorney(s): RICHARD N BARNES 
Video 
Tape Number: 2003-017 Tape Count: 3:21 
HEARING 
This matter comes now before the court for pretrial on trial de 
novo and for hearing on plaintiff's motion to dismiss appeal. 
The Court having heard argument from respective parties, denies 
the motion to dismiss the appeal. Trial de novo is set for 4-8-03 
at 9:00 am. The parties are aware that this matter is double-set, 
and they are to keep in contact with this court. 
TRIAL DE NOVO is scheduled. 
Date: 04/08/2003 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: 
Before Judge: 
Room 321 
TOOELE COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
47 SOUTH MAIN 
TOOELE, UT 84 074 
RANDALL SKANCHY 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - TOOELE COURT 
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CLIFTON PANOS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JENNIFER ANN CASTLE, 
Defendant, 
MINUTES 
TRIAL DE NOVO 
Case No: 038300082 ST 
Judge: RANDALL SKANCHY 
Date: April 8, 2003 
Clerk: tawnil 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff(s): CLIFTON PANOS 
Defendant(s): JENNIFER ANN CASTLE 
Defendant's Attorney(s): RICHARD N BARNES 
Video 
Tape Number: 2 0 03-022 Tape Count: 9:52 
TRIAL 
Mr. Panos argues motion for reconsideration re dismissal of 
appeal. The Court, having heard argument from respective parties, 
denies dismissing the appeal from justice court. The trial de 
novo is to proceed. 
Mr. Panos proffers his testimony. He is sworn and questioned on 
cross examination by Mr. Barnes. 
Officer Jorge Chiclo and Jennifer Ann Castle testify on direct 
examination by Mr. Barnes and cross examination by Mr. Panos. 
Defendant's exhibits #1-7 are received. 
COUNT: 11:07 
Mr. Panos and Mr. Barnes present closing argument. 
COUNT: 11:22 
The Court states findings on the record. The Court finds the 
plaintiff has not met the burdon of proof, and finds no cause of 
action in favor of the defendant. This matter is dismissed. 
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